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STILL RUNNING AGAINST THE WIND:t A
COMMENT ON ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
AND LAKER AIR WAYS LTD. V. SABENA,
BELGIAN WORLD AIRLINES
C. PAUL ROGERS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The perceived "extraterritorial" jurisdictional' reach,
as well as, the substance of the United States antitrust
laws continues to cause considerable international tension. Whenever restraints of foreign concerns cause the
requisite "effect" 2 on United States commerce, the Sherman and Clayton Acts confer jurisdiction against foreign
corporations regardless of where the objectionable conduct occurred. Foreign nations often resent the perceived
ubiquitous nature of American antitrust law, with its
t Bob Seeger, Against the Wind (1980).
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Southern Methodist University; Faculty Advisor,Journal of Air Law & Commerce. B.A.,J.D., University of Texas; LL.M., Columbia University. Randy Shorb provided useful research
help in the initial stages of this project. My colleague, Werner Ebke, provided
many helpful comments on an earlier draft. He would, I believe, still disagree
with much of the final version. This article is dedicated to Carl W. Galloway.
I Extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to a court's assertion of jurisdiction over
conduct outside of the court's normal jurisdictional territory that has an impact
within the jurisidiction. Thus, the focus, for jurisdictional purposes, is on the
"territorial" effects of conduct originating elsewhere. See Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (asserting
that the territorial effects doctrine should not be referred to as an extraterritorial
assertion of jurisdiction).
2 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443-44
(2d Cir. 1945) (agreements made abroad unlawful under Sherman Act "if they
were intended to affect imports and did not affect them."). For a fuller discussion
of Alcoa and its progeny, see notes 14-41 and accompanying text.
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treble damage component, 3 and regard its attempted enforcement within their boundaries as a direct infringe4
ment of their sovereignty.
In reaction to this wielding of transnational power, foreign governments have enacted a variety of legislative responses.5 Such statutes generally curtail discovery of
business documents and records, thus effectively thwarting the normal "trial by document" antitrust suit. Other
strategies include the statutory non-recognition of foreign
judgments for multiple damages, 6 aimed specifically at the
See Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States:
A View From Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 202-04 (1978). Interestingly, the
resentment of United States extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws is particularly high among its allies. See Grossfeld and Rogers, A Shared Values Approach
to Jurisdictional Conflicts in InternationalEconomic Law, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 931
(1983). See also Davidson, The Canadian Response to the Overseas Reach of the United
States Antitrust Law Stage I and Stage II Amendments to the Combines Investigation, 2
CAN.- U.S. L.J. 166 (1979); Henry, The United States Antitrust Laws: A Canadian Viewpoint, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 249 (1970); Samie, The ExtraterritorialEnforcement of
United States Antitrust Laws: The British Reaction, 16 INT'L LAw. 313 (1982); Toms,
The French Response to the ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Antitrust Laws, 15
Int'l L. 585 (1981).
4 As early as 1947, an American grand jury investigation of an American corporation resulted in conflict when a demand for production of documents from a
Canadian subsidiary was opposed by the subsidiary. The court denied a motion
to vacate a subpoena duces tecum. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Addressed to Canadian Int'l Paper Co., 72 F.Supp. 1013, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Other early U.S. antitrust cases prompting protest from abroad include United
States v. General Elec. Co., 83 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1949), modified, 115 F. Supp.
835 (D.N.J. 1953);-United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). See A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 360-72 (2d ed. 1970).
5 See, e.g., British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. (authorized
administrative prohibition of discovery, non-recognition of foreign judgments,
and "clawback" of punitive damages); Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction
of Enforcement) Act, AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 13 (1979) (restricts enforcement of U.S.
antitrust judgments); Atomic Energy Act, No. 90 § 30, 15 STAT. REPUB. S. AFR.
1045 (1967) (disclosure of information may constitute criminal offense); Uranium
Information Security Regulations, CAN. STAT. 0. & REGS. 77-836 (1977) (disclosure of material relating to uranium pricing constitutes crime); Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 121, § 5 (1976)
(authorizes prohibition of production of evidence or documents for foreign tribunals); Atomic Energy Control Act, CAN. REV. STAT. CH. A-19 (1970) (empowers
agency to enact regulations to protect the Canadian uranium industry).
6 See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (British law) ; Foreign
Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 13
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treble damage entitlement of American antitrust law. 7
Novel "clawback" provisions allow recoupment of any
damages paid above the amount of actual damages suffered, transforming United States antitrust judgments
from punitive to compensatory.8 In contrast, diplomatic
accords between the United States and foreign governments, in which the governments agree to consult where
the interests of one may be affected by the extraterritorial
enforcement of the law of the other, have been largely
ineffective. 9
Foreign statutory provisions are thus used to limit the
extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws. Initially these "blocking" statutes appear entirely defensive,
with apparent goals to protect the enacting country's jurisdiction and to defer to its courts to resolve antitrust disputes free of foreign interference.' 0 These purely
defensive attributes come into question in light of the
(1979). For a discussion of British statutory "clawback" of punitive damages, see
infra note 8 and accompanying text.
7 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "any person who shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue .. .and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained." 15 U.S.C.
§ 15(a) (1982).
For instance, Section 6 of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act creates a cause of action which allows recoupment of the amount above actual damages awarded. A "qualifiying defendant" who has paid an overseas multiple
damage judgment retains a cause of action to "clawback" that portion of the judgment that is penal rather than compensatory in nature. The Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 § 6. See generally Note, Power to Reverse ForeignJudgments:
The British Clawback Statute Under InternationalLaw, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1103-

04 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Columbia Note] (discussing British disfavor
with multiple damages).
U.S.-Canada Accord on Antitrust Cooperation, [Jan.-June] 46 ArISee, e.g.,
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1156, at 524, 560 (March 15, 1984); U.S. Australia Accord on Antitrust Enforcement, [July - Dec.], 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1071, at 36 (July 1, 1982); U.S.-German Agreement on Antitrust
Co-operation, I1J. WORLD TRADE L. 95 (1977). See also Note, The United States-Australian Cooperation Agreement: A Step in the Right Direction, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 127
(1983); Note, A ComparativeAnalysis of the Efficacy of BilateralAgreements in Resolving
Disputes Between Sovereigns Arisingfrom ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Law: The
Australian Agreement, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 49 (1983).
10 See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 938
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
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overriding principle of international comity.II Comity requires that the decision of a foreign tribunal be given deference by domestic courts if at all possible. While the
goals of "blocking" statutes appear to be defensive, their
effect is often obstruction of the decisions of foreign
courts.
t2
The case critiqued here, Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena,
illustrates a purely offensive use of foreign statutory mandates against a United States antitrust suit. The resulting
jurisdictional conflict, arising from attempts by the United
Kingdom to insulate its business entities from United
States antitrust law and domestic policies, embodies fundamentally opposed policies regarding the desirability
and scope of legislation controlling anticompetitive and
restrictive business practices.' 3 First, a history of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction will be given through a brief
discussion of the principal cases.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL

JURISDICTION

A. Judicial Interpretations
The first attempts at the application of extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States antitrust laws provided
little hint of the ensuing international tension and conflict. The first significant international Sherman Act case,
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. ,4 involved a treble
damage action alleging that the defendant had prompted
Costa Rican soldiers to seize the plaintiff's Panamanian
banana plantation. The defendant's actions were in furtherance of its plan to prevent competition and monopo-

I

International comity denotes the deference a court pays to the acts of a foreign sovereign and its legal systems. Laker, 731 F.2d at 937. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 39 (1965)
(comity is one factor to be considered in determining jurisdiction); Davidow, ExtraterritorialAntitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 500, 512-14
(1981) (noting domestic forum rarely sacrifices jurisdiction in interest of comity).
12 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
" Id. at 955.
14 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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lize the banana trade. As the plaintiff alleged no effect on
American commerce, the lower courts held that no cause
of action existed under the Sherman Act.' 5 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed, finding two bases for its
decision.' 6 The Court first noted that a foreign immunity
attached to the acts of the Costa Rican soldiers who acted
under the authority of a foreign government.' 7 The
Court further held the Sherman Act inapplicable to acts
done within the territory of a foreign sovereign.'
Subsequently, United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica (Alcoa)' 9 greatly expanded the jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act over acts performed outside of the United States. In
Alcoa, a Swiss company, Alliance, entered into an agreement with its shareholders, aluminum production companies incorporated in France, Germany, Switzerland,
Britain and Canada, to set a quota for production of aluminum. The agreement required any shareholder exceeding the quota to pay progressive royalties to Alliance.
Although the United States corporate co-defendant, Alcoa, benefited from the agreement since exports to the
United States
were included in the quotas, it was not a
2°
party to it.
The agreement originated in Europe, thus raising the
issue as to whether the Sherman Act extended to the conduct of foreign nationals outside the United States. Judge
Learned Hand, delivering the opinion of the court, found
that: "[a]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its bor15 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 166 F. 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1908).
16 213 U.S. at 359.
17 Id. at 358-59.
18Id. at 357. Although American Banana appeared to have foreclosed extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, later cases narrowed its application. In
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), defendants entered into a
conspiracy in the U.S. to monopolize the Yucatan Sisal industry. Distinguishing
American Banana, the Supreme Court approved the exercise ofjurisdiction because
the conduct partially occurred in the U.S. and intentionally affected Amercian
trade. Id. at 276. See also United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106

(1911)).
,9 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. at 442.

20
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ders that has consequences within its borders which the
state reprehend; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize. 21 The court envisaged three pertinent
situations. First were agreements made outside the
United States that affect United States commerce
although not intending to do so. The court held mere effect an insufficient ground for the exercise of jurisdiction.2 2 Second were agreements that intend to affect
United States imports and exports but fail to achieve this
result. Again, the court considered this an insufficient basis ofjurisdiction.23 Third were agreements that intend to
affect U.S. commerce and that actually do affect U.S. commerce. The court held the Sherman Act applicable to the
latter situations. 24 Further, the court found that plantiff's
showing of intent shifted the burden of proof, putting the
defendant to the task of showing no effect was actually
achieved.25
Subsequent cases utilized the Alcoa effects test as a
touchstone for analysis 26 and the Restatement (Second) of
ForeignRelations Law of the United States incorporates the approach as well.27 No subsequent decision, however, has
applied the intent/effects test to the exclusively foreign
2,

Id. at 443.

23

Id.
Id. at 441.

24

Id. at 444.

22

Id. With this shifting of burden of proof, the defendant's task of showing no
effect has proved a difficult chore, as the variables of international trade make
measurement difficult.
26 See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T.& S.A., 549 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information
Center, Inc., 1963 TRADE CAS. (CCH) § 70,600, at 77, 414.
25

27

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 18 (1965). See Fugate, Antitrust Aspects of the Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law, 25 VA.J. INT'L L. 49 (1984). Additionally, other states are adopting the "effects" doctrine as a valid basis for jurisdiction. See generally Picciotto,Jurisdictional
Conflicts, InternationalLaw and the InternationalState System, 11 INT. J. Soc. L. 11, 2325 (1983) (European Community Commission "boldly" accepting effects doctrine
ofjurisdiction); Davidow, supra note 11, at 504 (International Law Association rec-

ognizes state's right to punish foreign conduct intentionally inflicting reprehensible effects within the state); Rahi, InternationalApplication of American Antitrust Laws:

Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 336, 341 (1980) (noting EEC, West
Germany, and Austria explicitly invoke "effects" jurisdiction).
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conduct of foreign parties. Instead, cases dealing with
foreign activities have emphasized participation by an
American party.28 Nonetheless, the effects test has been
condemned abroad as a violation of foreign sovereignty.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N. T. & S.A. 2 9
provided a significant alternative to the effects test.
Timberlane, an Oregon lumber purchaser and importer,
formed two Honduran corporations to acquire forest
properties and a lumber mill in that country. It purchased
a controlling interest in an insolvent Honduran mill and
reopened it. Attempts to purchase the remaining interests in the mill were rebuffed by creditors of the mill,
some of whom owned significant interests in competing
mills. These creditors initiated legal proceedings in Honduras that resulted in a court appointed conservator's order to shut down and thus cripple operation of the mill.
Timberlane alleged that defendants had conspired to
keep control of the Honduras lumber export business in
the hands Of a few individuals who were financed and
dominated by a defendant bank, effectively preventing
Timberlane from milling lumber in Honduras and exporting it to the United States, in violation of the Sherman
30
Act.
The Timberlane court began its analysis with a review of
Alcoa, noting the extensive criticism of the effects test by
foreign commentators. 3 1 Citing its failure to take the in28 See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962) (U.S. corporation and Canadian subsidiary conspired to monopolize sale
of vanadium in Canada and exclude plaintiff from market); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (conspiracy of British
parent and American subsidiary to divide foreign territories); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) (participation by U.S. company
in quota agreement through ownership of foreign companies).
29 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
3o Id. at 610.
31 Id. at 611-12. For criticisms of foreign commentators authored prior to

Timberlane, see

NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

365-72 (2d ed. 1970); Zwarensteyn, The Foreign Reach of the American Antitrust Laws,
3 AM. Bus. Lj. 163, 165-169 (1965); Haight, Comment to Miller "ExtraterritorialEffects of Trade Regulation" [hereinafter cited as "Miller"], Ill U. PA. L. REV. 1117,
1118-19 (1963); Ellis, Comment to "Miller," 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1129, 1129-32
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terests of foreign nations into consideration, the court
viewed the effects test as an inadequate basis for jurisdiction determination .3 The court concluded that a tripartite analysis, subsequently referred to by many courts as
the judicial interest analysis, was necessary to achieve a
more equitable approach to assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction." This tripartite test required resolution of
three questions: One, does the alleged restraint affect, or
was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the
United States; Two, is it of such a type and magnitude so
as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act; and,
Three, as a matter of international comity and fairness,
should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United
States be asserted to cover it? 34 The court noted that the
last portion of the proposed test is often obscured by application of the effects test. 35 To differentiate the two and
to provide content to the comity concept, the court proposed seven potential factors to be weighed, including the
degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties, the extent to which enforcement by either country would achieve compliance, a
comparison of the effects upon the United States with
those upon foreign states, the existence of an explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad. 6
The court, in applying its tripartite test, concluded that
(1963); Katzenback, Conflicts on An Unruly Horse, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1150 (1956).
For more contemporary foreign critics treatment of the effects doctrine, see
Gordon, ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Economic Laws: Britain Draws the
Line, 14 INT. L. 151, 153 (1980); Hacking, The ExtraterritorialImpact of U.S. Laws: A
Causefor Concern Amongst Friends of America, 1 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 1-3 (1979);

Stanford, supra note 3.
32 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-14.
Id. at 615.
Id.
11 Id. at 614. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 8, at § 40 (incorporation of Timberlane factors).
-6 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
"

34
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the lower court's dismissal of Timberlane's suit for lack of
jurisdiction could not be upheld. In applying comity, the
court found that most of the conspiratorial activity took
place in Honduras, the most direct economic effort was
on Honduras and some of the defendants were foreign
citizens. On the other hand, no conflict with Honduras
law or policy was indicated nor had a "comprehensive
analysis of the relative connections and interests of Honduras and the United States" been undertaken.3" Accordingly, the court remanded the jurisdictional question to
the trial court for a fuller examination of the involved interests of the two countries.
Although Timberlane was hailed as a needed curtailment
of the jurisdictional excesses arising from the Alcoa effects
test, 39 its tripartite analysis still has generated controversy. The competency and authority of judges to consider the foreign policy issues inherent in the balancing
approach as well as their ability to give foreign interests
an objective assessment have been questioned. American
courts tend to give greater weight and are more sensitive
to American interests than foreign interests. 40 These perceived inequities continue to bring criticism from here
37 The court vacated the district court's jurisdictional dismissal and remanded
for further analysis pursuant to its tripartite test. Id.
38Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
39See Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296-98 (3d
Cir. 1979). At this writing a bill is pending in Congress which would require U.S.
courts and enforcement agencies in antitrust cases which may harm foreign interests to balance the foreign state's interests against U.S. antitrust enforcement policy. Under this "jurisdictional rule of reason" the court would dismiss the action
if it found that the foreign interests outweighed U.S. interests. It would also allow
U.S. courts to limit a plaintiff's recovery to actual damages if necessary to reduce
the adverse effects to the foreign interests and would provide for expedited resolution of jurisdictional issues prior to discovery. The bill, if enacted, would be
entitled "the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985." S.397, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
- See United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., No.50,827, (Santa Fe
County N.M. 1972), afd, 629 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901
(1981) (State of New Mexico's interest in fair trial within its boundaries "must
govern over the national interest or policy of a foreign country as legislated and
conceived by that foreign country."). Cf In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1979) (U.S. firm cannot be sanctioned
where production of documents located in Canada would violate Canadian law).
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and abroad.4 1
B.

Document Discovery in ExtraterritorialAntitrust Litigation:
The Uranium Cartel Litigation

Extraterritorial, like domestic antitrust litigation, normally involves extensive document discovery. 42 The recent Westinghouse litigation is illustrative. In the 1960's
Westinghouse entered into contracts to supply uranium
for nuclear reactors that it manufactured and sold. Longterm, fixed price supply contracts were offered to utilities
purchasing reactors. In September, 1975 Westinghouse
advised fourteen utilities and utility groups that the uranium supply contracts would not be honored because a
drastic increase in the world-wide price of uranium had
rendered performance "commercially impracticable"
under the Uniform Commercial Code.4 3 Predictably, the
41 The Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law seemingly embraces the
Timberlane approval to jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984) §§ 402-403, 415. See Fugate, supra note 27. In contrast, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a)(3), which deals with export trade, essentially codifies the Alcoa test, in effect rejecting the Timberlane approach to jurisdiction. It
grants Sherman Act jurisdiction whenever export actitivity has a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on import trade or interstate commerce."
For scholarly criticism of Timberlane see Maier, Interest Balancingand Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction,31 AM. J. CoMp. L. 579 (1983); Kadish, Comity and the InternationalApplication of the Sherman Act: EncouragingCourts to Enter the PoliticalArena, 4 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 130 (1982). A suggested "shared values" approach seeks to eliminate
some of the perceived prejudice occasioned by the Timberlane "interest analysis."
The initial focus of a court would be upon the values underlying the foreign law.
If similar values provide the rationale for both foreign and domestic law, justification for refusal to apply the foreign law diminishes profoundly. See Grossfeld and
Rogers, supra note 3, at 943-44. For support of Timberlane, see Gordon, Trends, 13
INT'L. LAW 371, 373-77 (1979); Gill, Two Cheersfor Timberlane, 10 Swiss REV. INT'L
ANTITRUST L. 3 (1980); Jacobs, ExtraterritorialApplication of Competition Laws: An
English View, 13 INT'L L. 645, 651 (1979).
42 For general discussions of discovery in extraterritorial suits, see GILL,
Problems of Foreign Discovery, in ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 485
(Brewster ed. 1976); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in
Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979); Note, Discovery of Documents Located
Abroad in US. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign
Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747 (1974).
43 U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977).
The typical Westhouse contract extended for considerable periods of time at prices fixed at the time of the sale. The contract prices,
in the range of six dollars per pound, were dramatically lower than the subsequent
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utilities promptly sued Westinghouse, seeking enforcement of the supply contracts."
In September, 1976, the files of an Australian uranium
producer surreptitiously surfaced, revealing an international uranium cartel involving uranium producers and
the governments of Australia, Canada, South Africa, and
Great Britain. 45 The cartel had manipulated the market
for uranium by restricting output. Westinghouse immediately filed antitrust actions against twenty-nine uranium
producers, including seventeen U.S. firms and twelve foreign companies."
Westinghouse's attempts to discover documents and
materials pertinent to the cartel in Australia, Canada, and
South Africa met with failure as those governments
rushed through legislation making it a criminal offense to
release documents for use in "foreign" litigation.47
market price for uranium which reached forty dollars per pound. N.Y. TIMES, July
9, 1976, at 29 col. 1.
44 The cases were consolidated in In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contracts Litigation, 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981).
4
See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, [1977] 3
All E.R. 703, 707.
-6 See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979); In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The Westinghouse litigation finally settled in 1980 and 1981 with many of the defendants paying Westinghouse while denying liability.
In a separate action, United Nuclear Corporation (UNC) obtained a default
judgment in a declaratory judgment action against General Atomic Company
(GAC). UNC, a uranium producer, had contracted to supply uranium to GAC.
Alleging commercial impracticability, UNC claimed the uranium price-fixing conspiracy rendered the contracts unenforceable. GAC had agreed prior to Canada's
enactment of blocking regulations to produce documents located in Canada.
Upon GAC's failure to produce pursuant to court order after the Canadian regulations were enacted, the trial court entered a default judgement on the merits
charging GAC with a lack of good faith in its production efforts. United Nuclear
Corp. v. General Atomic Co., No. 50,827 (Santa Fe County, N.M. 1972), arffd, 629
P.2d 231 (N.M. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981).
.7
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Westinghouse employed several discovery attempts, including document production sought from Rio Algam Corporation, a Delaware corporate subsidiary of a Canadian corporation. The appellate
court concluded that attempts to obtain documents located in Canada would subject Rio Algam to criminal sanctions of the Canadian Uranium Information Security Regulations and that this Canadian interest outweighed Westinghouse's need
for the information. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Litigation, 563 F.2d
992, 998-99 (10th Cir. 1977).
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Although the United Kingdom did not immediately pass
similar legislation, Westinghouse's attempts at document
discovery there met with English judicial opposition.4 8
Subsequently, Britain enacted the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 49 which, inter alia, empowers its Secretary of State to forbid individuals within the United
Kingdom from producing "commercial documents" or
"commercial information" for use in litigation outside the
United Kingdom where the request for information "infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom" or is
otherwise "prejudicial" to its sovereignty, security or international relations.50 In addition, discovery of documents pursuant to so-called "fishing expeditions" is
prohibited. 51 These portions of the act provided much of
the impetus for the conflicts arising in the Laker Airways
litigation.5 2
III.

LAKER AIRWAYS LTD. V. SABENA, BELGIAN WORLD
AIRLINES

A.

Background
In 1977, Laker Airways, Ltd., a British corporation, began operating a "no-frills" transatlantic airline service between London and New York." As transatlantic air
48 See In Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1977] 3 ALL. E.R. 703; Rio Tinto Zing
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81.
49 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. See supra note 8 and infra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text. For critiques of this Act, see Owles, Some
Doubts About the Protection of Trading Interests Bill, 130 NEw L.J. 320 (1980); Comment, The Protection of Trading InterestsAct of 1980: Britain's Response to U.S. ExtraterritorialAntitrust Enforcement, 2 Nw. J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 476 (1980).
5o Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 § 2.
5, Id. ch. 11, § 2(3)(a)(b). This provision is specifically designed to block civil
investigative demands issued by U.S. enforcement agencies prior to the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and civil requests for "all relevant documents" or
the like which do not specify the doments sought. See House of Commons Standing Comm. F., Official Report, Dec. 6, 1979 at 36.
52 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
53 Laker attempted to begin transatlantic service as early as 1971, but due to
alleged resistance from competitors, procurement of the necessary authorizations
from the goverments of Great Britain and the U.S. was delayed until 1977. Id. at
916. For an enlightening account of the Laker Airways saga, see A. SAMPSON,
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service prices are "substantially controlled" by the International Air Transport Association (IATA),54 Laker's
"no-frills" low cost passenger service jeopardized the existing system of cartelized pricing. Beginning in 1977, the
IATA airlines allegedly retaliated by conspiring to set
prices at a predatory below cost level in an attempt to
eliminate Laker. In 1981, Pan American Airlines, Trans
World Airlines, and British Airways dropped their fares
even lower on their full-service flights and met the price
of Laker's "no-frills" package. These airlines also allegedly paid travel agents secret commissions for diverting
potential customers from Laker. Laker, as a result of the
cartel, had to reschedule its financial obligations. Sabena,
KLM, and other IATA airlines, however, allegedly pressured Laker's creditors to withhold previously promised
financing. 55 Not surprisingly, Laker was forced to liquidate in 1982.
Through its liquidator, 56 Laker initiated an action in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
against competing transatlantic airlines, alleging that the
collective predatory pricing practices of these rivals had
excluded Laker from the transatlantic market.5 7 Subsequently, the foreign defendants and a British bank inEMPIRES OF THE SKIES: THE POLITICS, CONTESTS AND CARTELS OF WORLD AIRLINES

147-62 (1984).
"' The IATA, a trade organization of the world's largest-air carriers, establishes
fixed fares at an annual meeting. Upon authorization by the individual governments of affected nations, these standard fares become effective. Laker's discount
fares were approximately one-third of the standard fares established by the IATA
cartel. Laker, 731 F.2d at 916-17.
55 Laker's financial structure, consisting largely of U.S. debts and expenses in
dollars, had been greatly weakened by the decreased value of the English pound
sterling. The competing airlines, seizing upon this financial difficulty, allegedly
planned to increase their prices after driving Laker out of business. Id.
56 The court characterized Laker's antitrust action as primarily an effort to satisfy its creditors, largely U.S. banks and other lending institutions. Id. at 924.
57 The defendants in this suit, filed November 24, 1982, included Pan American
World Airlines, Trans World Airlines, McDonnell Douglas Corp., McDonnell
Douglas Finance Corp., British Airlines, British Caledonian Airways, Lufthansa,
and Swissair. KLM and Sabena were named in the second action, filed February
15, 1983 which was subsequently consolidated with the first antitrust suit. Id. at
917-19. Actual damages were alleged to be $350 million, which trebled would
provide a recovery of over $1 billion. A. Sampson, supra note 53, at 159.
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volved in Laker's unsuccessful refinancing attempt
obtained interlocutory injunctions from the British High
Court of Justice preventing further action by Laker
against them in U.S. courts. 58 Laker then began a second
antitrust action in the U.S. against KLM and Sabena. The
district court consolidated the two actions and granted
Laker a preliminary injunction that prevented KLM,
Sabena, and the American defendants from taking any action before a foreign tribunal that would impair the jurisdiction of the U.S. court.5s In May, 1983, the British High
Court of Justice held that the injunctive relief requested
by the original defendants in Laker's U.S. antitrust suit
United States action did not
was not justified because the
60
violate British sovereignty.
Subsequently, the British government invoked the British Protection of Trading Interests Act, which was enacted
in 1980.61 Pursuant to its authority, the British Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry issued an order prohibiting entities carrying on business within the United Kingdom from complying with measures arising out of Laker's
U.S. antitrust action, after determining that the American
lawsuit "threaten[ed] to damage the trading interests of
the United Kingdom.

' 62

The British Court of Appeal

ruled that the order was valid, and concluded "the United
States District Court action was 'wholly untriable' and
could result in a 'total denial of justice to' the British airlines."' 63 Thus Laker was enjoined from taking further
Laker, 731 F.2d at 918.
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124
(D.D.C. 1983).
60 British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 W.L.R. 545, 549.
11 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. The Act authorizes the
English Secretary of State to require business entities operating in the United
Kingdom to refuse to comply with foreign judicial orders, including requests for
document production. Id. See also Owles, supra note 49, at 322-23; Comment,
supra note 49, at 478.
62 Laker, 731 F.2d at 920.
-3 Id. (quoting British Airways Board, [1983] 3 W.L.R. at 573, 591). The English
court's conclusion about the triability of the American suit was, interestingly,
compelled by the order of the English Secretary of State barring the two British
airlines from Laker's discovery requests. The English court concluded that the
58

59
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steps against the British defendants in its U.S. antitrust
suit.
Defendants KLM and Sabena, which had been preliminarily enjoined by the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia from seeking English relief from the American lawsuit, appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They asserted that the injunction
violated their right to initiate "parallel" actions in foreign
courts, contravened principles of international comity
which ordinarily proscribes interference with foreign judicial proceedings, and impeded Britain's "paramount
right" to apply British law to Laker, a British subject. 64
The Court of Appeals refused to overturn the injunction,
ruling that the British proceedings were not entitled to
comity because they were not intended to protect British
jurisdiction but were meant to quash U.S. judicial
authority.
Laker had, in the interim, appealed to the House of
Lords from the adverse British Court of Appeal holding.
In July, 1984, after the United States Court of Appeals decision, the House of Lords overturned the British Court
of Appeal injunctions barring Laker's prosecution of U.S.
antitrust claims against British defendants.6 5 The House
of Lords ruled that no valid reason to restrain Laker's antitrust suit existed since all British parties, Laker, and the
British defendant carriers British Airways and British Caledonian Airways, were legitimately subject to United
forum
States law and since the U.S. court was the only
66
competent to determine the merits of the claim.
British defendants would not thereafter be able adequately to defend themselves
as a result of the executive order. Laker, 731 F.2d at 947 and n.141.
Laker, 731 F.2d at 915, 921.
65 British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 All E.R. 39 (HL).
- Id. at 47. The House of Lords also rejected the view of the Court of Appeal
that the order of the Secretary of State arising from the Protection of Trading
Interests Act was the "decisive factor" in enjoining Laker from proceeding in the
United States. Id. at 55-56. See infra notes 130-131 and accompanying text. The
House of Lords decision precipitated serious settlement negotiations between
Laker and the twelve defendants. See WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1985, p. 17, col. 3
(reporting settlement offer of at least $40 million); 48 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
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While the House of Lords decision does much to dissipate the jurisdictional conflict which had earlier arisen,
the main focus of the balance of this article will be the
United States Court of Appeals decision, rendered before
the House of Lords opinion, which attempts to protect
U.S. antitrust jurisdiction against perceived pendente lite interference by a foreign tribunal. The United States decision was a response to the most vigorous opposition yet
to a U.S. antitrust claim and demonstrates the limitations
that the judiciary has at its disposal in giving recognition
to foreign interests.
B.

ConcurrentJurisdiction

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
began its analysis of the validity of KLM and Sabena's
claim by examining both the U.S. and English bases of jurisdiction. The primary U.S. basis, territoriality, allows a
state to address conduct occurring outside its territorial
boundaries that intentionally affects commerce within the
state. 67 The court noted that a state's regulatory efforts
must logically extend beyond geographical boundaries in
order to address effectively harmful activities that "pierce
its 'sovereign' walls." 6
According to the court, defendants' predatory pricing
conspiracy, if true, would substantially affect American interests and policies. Although Laker was a British corporation, its liquidating creditors included numerous United
States claimants. 69 The court reasoned that businesses
REP. (BNA) at 897 (May 23, 1985). The suit was finally settled for a reported $48
million, although defendants contended that the settlement bore " 'no admission
of guilt' ". Sir Freddie Laker, Laker's founder and chief executive officer, was
offered a reported $8 million of the total. See Wall St.J.,July 15, 1985, p. 4, col. 1.
67 Laker, 731 F.2d at 921-22. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) discussed supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, the Laker court took exception to the term "extraterritorial" jurisdiction, insisting that the basis for jurisdiction resulted from "territorial" effects.
Laker, 731 F.2d at 923. See also infra note 133.
68 Laker, 731 F.2d at 923. This analysis is derived from Alcoa and its progeny.
See Picciotto, supra note 27, at 14-15; Rahl, supra note 27, at 341.
69 Laker, 731 F.2d at 925.
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operating within the U.S., such as the defendant airlines,
must agree to be bound by U.S. laws so that foreign corporations have the same legal responsibilities as domestic
entities. Additionally, the "greatest impact" of a predatory pricing conspiracy would be increased fares for passengers, a large number of whom would be U.S. citizens.70
A cogent argument existed, however, for Great Britain's jurisdiction over litigation initiated by a British corporation since a state retains prescriptive jurisdiction to
regulate the activities of its domestic business organizations. 7 1 Thus, the U.S. court recognized the concurrent
jurisdiction of the U.S. and Great Britain. However, the
court noted that such jurisdictional overlap normally does
not preclude the advancement of parallel legal actions in
both forums.72
The court pointed out that the possibility of simultaneous resolution in both forums was eroded, however, by
the injunctive and administrative relief procured in the
United Kingdom, which prompted Laker's procurement
of a U.S. injunction forbidding Sabena and KLM from attempts to escape liability through similar foreign actions.
While courts infrequently act to forbid parties from suing
in foreign jurisdictions, 3 an injunction may issue "when
the action of a litigant in another forum threatens to paralyze the jurisdiction of the court." ' 74 Thus, taking note of
the district court's duty to protect its jurisdiction, the
court of appeals concluded that the injunction was a
proper remedy.75
70 At one point, Laker Airways carried at least one of every seven air passengers
travelling between the U.S. and England. Id. at 917.
7, Id. at 926. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 27, 38 (1965). By "prescriptive jurisdiction" the court
meant that jurisdiction within which nations may legitimately exercise regulatory
power. Laker, 731 F.2d at 921.

72

Id. at 926.

71 According

to the court, this is because the bringing of a suit in one forum
does not affect the "preexisting right of an independent forum to regulate matters
subject to its prescriptive jurisdiction." Id. at 927.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 927-30.
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In its analysis, the appellate court considered the propriety of protecting Laker's right to litigate the "parallel"
proceeding before the U.S. courts. It noted that the alternative forums available to Laker that might properly
have considered a "parallel" action do not offer the antitrust remedies sought in the U.S. litigation. The English
proceeding was initiated to acquire exclusive prescriptive
jurisdiction for English courts even though no comparable remedies were available in that forum.7 6 Since the
sole purpose of the English action was to terminate the
American suit, the two actions were not parallel proceedings in the sense of two courts advancing to separate
judgments at the same time pursuant to one cause of action. 77 According to the Laker court, the U.S. district
judge "faced the stark choice
of either protecting or relin78
quishing his jurisdiction.
The Laker court also viewed antisuit injunctions as justified when necessary to prevent the evasion of the forum's
public policies, such as those underscoring U.S. antitrust
laws. 79 Since American antitrust law promotes a free market economy in American commerce, the commercial activities of foreign entities in the U.S. are subject to those
economic laws. It should be noted that if a foreign business entity's nationality were permitted to shield it from
U.S. antitrust laws, our economic laws would discriminate
against American enterprise.80
76 Many European countries apply another country's mandatory laws even
when asserting jurisdiction over the dispute where the foreign country's interest is
substantial and reflects values showed by the forum country. See European Economic Community Contracts Convention of 1980, Art. 7 reprinted in 19 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1492 (1980). See also B. GROSSFELD, PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND WIRTSCHAFrSRECHTs at 95-99 (1975) and Grossfeld & Rogers,

supra note 3 at 937-39. The United Kingdom was, however, unlikely to apply
United States antitrust law in the Laker litigation given its governmental policy of
protecting its individuals against United States antitrust jurisdiction. See supra
notes 5-8.
77 Laker, 731 F.2d at 930.

Id.
Id. at 931 and n.69. See also RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 117 (1971).
8o Discrimination is dissipated, of course to the extent foreign states follow the
78

79
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Further, the court could not see how British trading interests were adversely affected by a suit brought by a British company against Dutch and Belgian corporations for
anticompetitive activities involving U.S.-Dutch and U.S.Belgian airline markets."' Thus, notwithstanding the concurrent jurisdiction of foreign forums, the court of appeals deemed the injunction against Sabena and KLM
valid.8 2
The appellate court next addressed KLM and Sabena's
contention that Great Britain's jurisdictional basis, the
English nationality of Laker, mandated resolution of the
dispute in an English forum. Adopting the appellant's label of "paramount nationality," the court stated:
We are asked to recognize an entirely novel rule.
Although a court has power to enjoin its nationals from
suing in foreign jurisdictions, it does not follow that the
United States courts must recognize an absolute right of
the British government to regulate the remedies that the
United States may wish to create for British nationals in
United States courts. The purported principle of paramount nationality is entirely unknown in national and international law. Territoriality, not nationality, is the
customary and preferred base of jurisdiction."3
The rationale of the proposed paramount nationality
rule was that important interests of foreign states are infringed when a foreign national sues in another forum
European model and apply U.S. antitrust laws as a mandatory foreign law. See
supra note 76. The U.S. ocean liner industry has long argued that its economic
health is impaired by the practical consequence of more limited U.S. antitrust enforcement against foreign liner companies serving U.S. ports than U.S. liners. See
generally D. MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARRELS: A STUDY IN THE SELF-REGULATION OF LINER CONFERENCES (1953); G. SLETNO & E. WILLIAMS, LINER CONFERENCE IN THE CONTAINER AGE, U.S. POLICY AT SEA (1981).
8, Laker, 731 F.2d at 932. British interests would be involved according to the
court, only if a British corporation had to pay the judgment. Id. at 933.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 935.
See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 comment b (Tent. Draft No. 2 1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

(1965).

§ 30 comment b
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against the wishes of the foreign state.84 But the Laker
court asserted that the right of the U.S. to control access
to its courts was more important, particularly where Congress has conferred specific remedies for certain actions
affecting U.S. trade. While Britain can sanction its citizens for availing themselves of U.S. remedies, the U.S. judiciary is not thereby required to retract the availability of
the relief.8 5 Further, the impracticalities of a paramount
nationality rule were apparent to the court because the
proliferation of multi-national corporations would render
identification of the nationality of a business entity for jurisdictional purposes complex and subject to the claims of
many countries, thus continuing the conflicts associated
with concurrent jurisdiction.86 Thus, the nationality of
the litigant was found to be only one factor to be considered in the determination of jurisdiction.8 7
Finally, the court noted that appellants were not British
subjects.88 As businesses operating within the U.S., KLM
and Sabena would expect and would be entitled to the
protection of United States law. 89 The court could not
countenance a jurisdictional rule, such as the proposed
paramount nationality approach, which would free appellants from obligations under U.S. law while continuing to
protect them from the antitrust offenses of other
corporations.O°
C.

Comity

KLM and Sabena next contended that principles of international comity mandated dismissal of Laker's United
States suit. The court initially defined the "complex and
elusive concept of comity" as "the degree of deference
that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign
84

Laker, 731 F.2d at 936.

85 Id.
86

Id.

"'

Id. at 935.

Id. at 936.
Id.
0 Id.

"

89'
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government not otherwise binding on the forum." 9 1 The
court ruled that while comity remains necessary to the relations between sovereigns, its application is limited
where one nation seeks to enforce interests "which are
fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum." 92 Significantly, the court characterized the U.S. injunction as defensive, attempting to protect the right of the
district court to adjudicate Laker's claim, and the English
injunction and administrative order as offensive, entailing
an attempt to curtail the power of U.S. courts to adjudicate valid claims under U.S. law.93 The United Kingdom
court had not only refused the initial opportunity to exercise comity, but through issuance of its injunction, interfered with ongoing litigation in the United States.
In addition, the British Protection of Trading Interests
Act protects "any person in the United Kingdom who carries on business there." 94 The order promulgated under
the act in the Laker proceeding prohibited any person in
the United Kingdom from furnishing "any commercial information which relates to the . . . Department of Justice
investigation or the grand jury or the District Court proceedings." '95 The order thus barred any airline doing
business in England from complying with the discovery
orders of the United States court, including, presumably,
U.S. airlines serving Great Britain.9 6 Further, the English
executive order was interpreted by the English Secretary
of State to bar the furnishing of any "commercial informa97
tion," even that located solely within the United States.
These factors interfered with United States interests in
enforcing its laws even as to U.S. defendants and underscored the lack of British interests in the defense by two
91 Id. at 937. See Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L. L. 280, 282-84 (1982).
112 Laker, 731 F.2d at 937.
9
Id. at 938.
94
95

Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 1.
Laker, 731 F.2d at 940.

96 Id.
97

Id.
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non-British airlines of an American antitrust suit. According to the court, exercise of comity here would allow a
foreign sovereign to dictate the authority of a U.S. court
to enforce U.S. laws on behalf of and against corporations
doing business in the U.S.98 Since the foreign sovereign's
interests were not, at least by comparison to U.S. interests, significant, and since the foreign sovereign's actions
were overbroad and did not solely protect its interests,
the court found that comity should not issue.99
D. Judicial Compromise
The Laker court identified the source of the conflict as
"the fundamentally opposed national policies toward prohibition of anticompetitive business activity" rather than
as emanating from the courts of the United Kingdom and
the United States.' 0 0 Britain's aversion to U.S. antitrust
law had, as noted, engulfed the principal branches of its
government. The scope of Britain's objections included
the breadth of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction, the substantive content of U.S. antitrust laws, the treble damage remedy, and the liberal allowance of pretrial "fishing
expeditions" (discovery). Judicial reconciliation of the
conflict was impossible because the British government
had defined "the British interest solely in terms of
preventing realization of United States interests" render°
ing the laws "contradictory and mutually inconsistent."'' 0
Judicial interest balancing, the so-called interest analysis given prominence in Timberlane, was found to be of no
help in resolving the conflict. The court expressed reservations about the efficacy of the approach generally, due
to the limited ability of a court to balance neutrally competing political factors. According to the Laker court, the
- Id. The Laker court characterized the British government as attempting to
"frustrate enforcement of American law in American courts against companies
doing business in America" and not as an effort "to see that justice is done anywhere, either in the United States or British courts." Id.
- Id. at 941.
,oo
Id. at 945.
1I Id.
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neutrality of any court is suspect, as are its qualifications
to evaluate comparative political policies from disparate
governments. 11 2 Thus the court found itself "in no position to adjudicate the relative importance of antitrust regulation or nonregulation to the United States and the
United Kingdom."' o3
The court also doubted that the balancing of interests
approach "would strengthen the bonds of international
comity" since United States courts have, in employing the
test, abdicated jurisdiction only when the United States
interest was de minimis.' °4 It pointed out that since most
developed nations follow international law only to the extent national law does not supercede it, national interests
of the forum are likely to prevail under any balancing
test. 10 5 Comity is thus not likely to be served.
The court viewed the interest analysis as perhaps providing a means of assessing the desirability of allocating
jurisdiction to one nation's courts over another. Where,
however, a court must select one forum's prescriptive jurisdiction over another's, particularly when the assertion
See also Grippando, Declining to Exercise ExtraterritorialAntitrust
102 Id. at 949-50.
Jurisdiction on Grounds of InternationalComity: An Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial
Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395 (1983).
- Laker, 731 F.2d at 949. See also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.
Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
The court cited Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax,
104 Laker, 731 F.2d at 950-51.
Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 870 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1001 (1982); Vespa
of Am. Corp. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 224, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Conservation Council of W. Australia v. Aluminum Co. of America, 518 F. Supp. 270
(W.D. Pa. 1981); National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 507 F. Supp.
1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), revd, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981) as cases where United
States effects were insignificant or non-existent. Laker, 731 F.2d at 951, n. 156. See
also In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th
Cir. 1977); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th
Cir. 1982). Of course, the mere willingness of courts to undertake an interest
analysis and consider foreign interests is significant and may result in more dismissals than otherwise would be the case. See Meesen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under
Customary InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 797-98 (1984). See also S.397,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) and supra note 39.
But see Messen, supra note 104, at 796-97; Haymann,
105 Laker, 731 F.2d at 951.
ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Law, the Swiss Approach, 12 Swiss REv. INT'L
ANTITRUST L. 17 (1982); Gerber, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983); Compare Maier, supra note 40 at 593-95.
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of foreign jurisdiction is intended solely to thwart domestic law and does not provide any remedy for aggrieved
parties, the court believed that the interest analysis was
unworkable. 0 6 To grant exclusive jurisdiction to the forum was suspect given the general limitations of the interest analysis. To acquiesce to British jurisdiction would
amount to a capitulation to the United Kingdom by the
U.S. judiciary of authority to regulate a part of
the U.S.
0 7
economy, solely because of British objections.1
The court concluded that, given its limited governmental authority and expertise, it could only act to protect its
legitimate jurisdiction. It recognized that nothing it could
do would resolve the underlying conflict and that "the ultimate question is not whether conflicting assertions of national interests must be reconciled, but the properforum of
reconciliation."'' 0 8 It concluded by urging that executive
and diplomatic sources be used to "exchange, negotiate
and reconcile" the conflicts arising from divergent economic policies.' 0 9
IV.

THE CASE FOR A LIMITED INJUNCTION

The dissent in Laker, written by Judge Starr, offered a
more conciliatory approach to the dilemma. In his view,
the status of Laker Airways as a British subject gave the
United Kindom at least some authority over where Laker
brought suit." 0 Given that, Judge Starr asserted that the
principles of international comity could be advanced by a
more limited injunction than that approved by the majority. The district court had effectively forbidden the foreign airline defendants from proceeding in any court
anywhere to contest Laker's right to sue in the United
States. Judge Starr argued that an injunction which precluded only countersuit injunctive relief during the penI- Laker, 731 F.2d at 948-52.
107 Id.
lo8 Id. at 955.
I9 Id.
110

Id. at 957. See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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dency of the U.S. antitrust action, thus allowing a
declaratory judgment action in the British court such as
that earlier pursued by Swissair and Lufthansa, would be
preferable.'' Courts of both countries would be afforded
the opportunity to adjudicate "the status of the parties
before it under that nation's laws and regulatory proviIf judgments were rendered in both ac11"1
sions .
tions, choice of law questions would arise when the
judgments were executed. In addition, allowance of concurrent proceedings would "preserve the possibiity" that
diplomatic negotiations or a defeat by Laker or the foreign defendants in their respective suits would "moot"
3

the conflict."1

The majority vigorously disagreed with the dissent's
"skewed view of comity," which would "require
mandatory deferral to a foreign action primarily intended
to cut off. . . domestic interests." ' "1 4 The fact that KLM
and Sabena, the appealing parties, were not British enterprises and were not attempting to seek refuge in their ownt5
courts further diminished Britain's claim to comity."
Britain's interests arising from Laker's British citizenship
were adequately protected, according to the majority, by
British government actions which did not interfere with
"the autonomy of the foreign [U.S.] judiciary or course of
" Laker, 731 F.2d at 958. Swissair and Lufthansa were two of the four foreign
airline defendants in Laker's first U.S. antitrust suit, along with British Airways
and British Caledonian Airways. They had joined the two British airline defendants in seeking relief in the United Kingdom enjoining Laker from proceeding
with its United States antitrust action.. Laker, 731 F.2d at 917-18.
12

Id. at 958.

Id.
Id. at 942-43. The majority distinguished Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981), "[t]he spirit of" which was relied upon by the dissent to support
the argument that a sovereign government can prohibit one of its nationals from
suing in another forum. Id. at 957. Dames & Moore involved the validity of the
termination of United States legal proceedings against Iran arising out of the
agreement with the Iranian government to secure the release of the Americans
held hostage in Tehran. The Laker majority pointed out that United States claims
were preserved and remedies provided for in Dames & Moore, unlike with regard to
the British government before it, which would cancel the claim without remedy.
Laker, 731 F.2d at 943.
11

15

Laker, 731 F.2d at 954, n.175.
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the foreign [U.S.] proceeding." ' 1 6 The majority pointed
out that the British Protection of Trading Interests Act
provided for a number of remedies, such as the clawback
provision, which protects English interests without inter7
fering with a pending foreign judicial proceeding.'
As to the breadth of the injunction, the majority noted
that the district court had sought to further comity by preserving the right of the parties to move to narrow its
scope. That the parties had not sought to do so evinced
not a waiver of that right but rather an indication that no
more limited relief was possible which would "protect the
admittedly legitimate United States jurisdiction while permitting participation in a British proceeding intended to
terminate the American action.""' 8
The allowance of a declaratory relief action in the
United Kingdom would offer no protection for U.S. jurisdiction, the court believed, unless the relief sought was
confined to a judgment that British law prohibits Laker
from suing in United States courts."t 9 The prior action by
Swissair and Lufthansa was not so limited; it sought an
injunction banning all actions in U.S. courts based on U.S.
antitrust laws.' 20 The Laker majority pointed out that U.S.
acquiesence to that type of interference with a pending
U.S. suit would "shut down" the U.S. proceeding rather
than enable the U.S. district court to protect its
21
jurisdiction.'
The dissent's conflict resolution approach does amount
to an abdication of U.S. jurisdiction to a foreign authority
during the pendency of the U.S. suit, unless the U.S. injunction can effectively limit the relief sought in the Brit-; Id. at 943.
117

Id.

Id. at 944.
119Id. at 945. The majority believed that a claim that foreign law forbids a for"

eign national from prosecuting a U.S. antitrust suit should initially be brought in
the U.S. trial court "free from the coercive threat of a possible antitrust injunction." Id. at 939, n.110.
,.0 Id. at 945.
121 Id. at 945, 954 n.175.

19851

AVIATION ANTITRUST

957

ish forum. The principal British interest due recognition
is the status of Laker as a British corporation. While British airlines were original defendants in Laker's U.S. antitrust suit, the injunction issued by the United States
district court involved only non-British defendants.
These defendants do serve the United Kingdom, just as
they serve the United States. However, they are charged
with violating U.S., not British law. British interests
through non-British defendants for actions not involving
1 22
substantive British law are tenuous at best.
Since Britain may have the right, cognizable under international law, to control the judicial forums of its nationals, it is difficult to see why such an injunction limiting
defendants to a concurrent British action on the sole
question of whether British law forbids Laker, as a British
subject, from suing in the United States could not issue.
If we presuppose the good faith of the British court in applying British law, which the U.S. Court of Appeals does,
deference to the British courts for determination of British law pursuant to the acknowledged legitimate British
interest seems appropriate and in furtherance of
23
comity. 1
The limited injunction is not without difficulty. Initially, it may be questioned whether foreign defendants in
a U.S. antitrust suit are the appropriate parties to question the right of the plaintiff to sue in the U.S. pursuant to
122

If an American plaintiff were to seek relief in a British court for violation of

British law against the same defendants, it is hard to imagine a United States court
attempting to block the action or assert exclusive jurisdiction.
123 The majority's position that a U.S. court decide the foreign (British) law
question, supra note 119, appears inappropriate given the recognized foreign law
interest. The majority does recognize that where an unsettled question of foreign
law presents itself, a U.S. district court would have the discretion to stay its action
pending a special proceeding in the foreign court limited to the resolution of the
foreign law question. Laker, 731 F.2d at 939, n. 110. Of course, that presupposes
the ability of a U.S. court to determine the settled and unsettled law of a foreign
jurisdiction. That kind of approach necessarily involves a substantive analysis of
foreign law. A limited injunction such as proposed herein would require that the
U.S. court "certify" to the foreign jurisdiction (the United Kingdom) the proceeding for a decision limited to the foreign law question without a determination by
the U.S. court as to the settled state of foreign law.
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the plaintiff's national laws. But to give any content to
Britain's interest in Laker as a British subject, the foreign
defendants must be allowed to bring such a proceeding.
Further, the real objection of the United Kingdom to
Laker's antitrust suit, it must be recognized, is not Laker's
initiation of the suit, but the jurisdiction of United States
antitrust laws. Specifically, under the British Protection of
Trading Interests Act the United Kingdom attempted to
squelch U.S. antitrust laws by authorizing the British Secretary of State to (1) require that businesses operating in
the United Kingdom cease compliance with designated
"foreign" judicial or regulatory orders, (2) prevent British
courts from complying with foreign document requests or
discovery orders and (3) forbid enforcement of foreign
antitrust judgments or treble damage awards. 24 The Act
does not, however, bar25British companies from initiating
U.S. antitrust actions.'
To recapitulate, the British Secretary of State's earlier
order at the behest of British Airways and British Caledonian Airways prevented persons carrying on business in
the United Kingdom, with the exception of United States
airlines, from complying with "United States antitrust
measures" arising from the U.S. district court. 126 The
English Court of Appeal ruled that the Secretary of State's
order was well within its authority and permanently enjoined Laker from proceeding with its U.S. antitrust7
claims against British Airways and British Caledonian. 1
The injunction against Laker, however, did not issue
because of a British law forbidding Laker's bringing of
U.S. antitrust suit; rather, it was required because the Secretary of State's order (1) prevented Laker from comply124 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.
See discussion Laker, 731
F.2d at 920.
1'
See Columbia Note, supra note 8, at 1104-08 for a detailed discussion of the
Act's provisions. Foreign defendants are specifically permitted to seek redress in
U.S. courts for antitrust injuries by way of private treble damage actions. Pfizer
Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
126 Laker, 731 F.2d at 920.
127 British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 All E.R. 375, 377 (CA).
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ing with any directions of the U.S. court and (2)
prohibited the British defendants from relying on their
own documents located in the United Kingdom to defend
themselves against Laker in the United States. As such,
the Court of Appeal concluded that an injunction against
Laker was necessary because the U.S. lawsuit was "wholly
in a "total denial of jusuntriable" and could result 1only
28
tice to" the British carriers.
British law as incorporated in the Protection of Trading
Interests Act does not directly bar Laker from instituting a
United States antitrust suit. The British High Court of
Justice, ruling on the injunctive relief sought by British
Caledonian and British Airways prior to the English Secretary of State's invoking of the act,' 29 and the House of
Lords ruling after resort to the act, both denied relief on
the ground that British sovereignty was not infringed by
Laker's suit against British defendants doing business in
the United States. 30 It would thus appear that British law
does not limit the foreign forums in which its nationals
can seek redress.
However, Section 1 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act empowers the British Secretary of State to order
any person carrying on business in the United Kingdom
to refuse to comply with foreign "measures" regulating
international trade where United Kingdom "trading interests" may be threatened or damaged.' 3' The intended
broad discretion given under that section to the British
executive may allow it to prohibit a British national from
bringing a U.S. antitrust suit.' 32 But that is an interpreta"2HId. at 376.

Id.
,,oBritish Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 All E.R. 39 (HL).
- Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 1. See Columbia Note,
129

supra note 8, at 1103-05; Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM.J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
112 The British Court of Appeal's injunction was based primarily on the difficulty of discovery of documents located in the United Kingdom due to the blocking provisions of § 2 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act. According to the
Court of Appeal, the blocking provisions would harm Laker's ability to prosecute
its U.S. suit and would even more seriously affect defendant's ability to defend
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tion of British policy which is for the British courts, not
the United States judiciary. It should not counsel against

a U.S. court limiting its injunction so as to permit British
courts to decide if British law can prevent Laker from using the United States judiciary to press antitrust claims.

The British interest over the forum rights of its citizens is
legitimate under international law and should alone permit the United Kingdom to interfere with pending United
States litigation.
A United States injunction limited along the lines described would limit the British courts to consideration of

the sole cognizable reason for interference with the
United States litigation. Other British interests, codified
by the Protection of Trading Interests Act, would not be
at issue at that time but would presumably still be used to

block production of documents, restrict enforceability of
judgments and the like. Concurrent jurisdiction and conflict would be preserved, but the United Kingdom would
not be permitted to usurp United States jurisdiction save
for the one legitimate reason.
V.

APPLICATION OF THE JUDICIAL INTEREST TEST

The unwillingness of the U.S. Court of Appeals to apply
the interest balancing test underscores its increasingly
recognized limitations. Laker, as the court acknowledged,
involved a case of concurrent jurisdiction. United States
3
jurisdiction was based on the concept of territoriality'1
themselves. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 All E.R. 395, 410
(CA). The Court of Appeal did not interpret the Act to bar the forums of its
nationals, id., nor did the House of Lords in its decision overturning the Court of
Appeal injunction. British Airways, [1984] 3 All E.R. 39 (HL). The House of Lords
further could not see how the blocking provisions of the Protection of Trading
Interests Act would harm defendants, since, under its terms, they could apply to
the British Secretary of State for his consent to disclose any documents which
would be helpful to their defense, Since the Secretary of State is "on their [defendants] side," the consent would likely be forthcoming. Id. at 56.
13" The court described territorial jurisdiction as arising from the "prerogative
of a nation to control and regulate activities within its boundaries. . . an essential
element of sovereignty." Laker, 731 F.2d at 921. As a result, conduct outside the
territorial boundary which has a substantial effect within the territory can be regulated by the state, just as conduct within the state which may have effects outside
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while British jurisdiction arose from the nationality of
some of the parties involved in the litigation. 3 4 Thejurisdiction of the two forums was thus not in issue; rather, the
question presented was the right of one forum affirmatively to interfere with an ongoing suit in a forum with
concurrent jurisdiction.
But, as the Laker court asserted, 13 5 the judicial interest
balancing approach does not seem suited for conflicts
arising from concurrent jurisdiction. The balancing approach necessarily involves consideration of a range of
factors, yet, the weight or relevance of each factor remains
uncertain. 136 For instance, Great Britain was the domestic
forum of Laker and a number of the defendants, lending
credence to the characterization of Great Britain as the
proper forum for resolution of the dispute. The actions
of the price-fixing cartel, however, had substantial detrimental effects on United States commerce, with the potential of significant damage to Laker's American
creditors. 37 Furthermore, United States antitrust law
provided Laker and its creditors with the widest and most
the state is also within a state's regulatory power. Id. at 921-22. The court rejected the idea that jurisdiction based on territorial effects is an extraterritorial
assertion of jurisdiction, since "jurisdiction exists only when significant effects
were intended within the prescribing territory." Id. at 923. According to the
court "the only extraterritoriality about the transactions reached under the territorial effects doctrine is that not all of the causative factors producing the proscribed result may have occurred within the territory." Id.
The Laker court's articulation of its jurisdiction base appears to be a reaffirmation of the Alcoa effects test which has caused so much foreign dissension, see
supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text, particularly in view of the rejection by
the court of the judicial interest analysis. See supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text. The jurisdictional base is noncontroversial on the Laker facts since all of
the defendants operated on American soil, but it renews the prospect of more
contentious assertions of jurisdiction, as in cases where defendants do not have
territorial contacts with the United States.
134
135

Laker, 731 F.2d at 926.
Id. at 948-53.

136 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) and supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. One attractive feature of the effects test is that it provides a relatively definite, predictable standard for determining jurisdiction. See Craig, ExtraterritorialApplication of
the Sherman Act." The Search for a JurisdictionalStandard, 7 Suffolk L.J. 295, 321
(1983).
137

Laker, 731 F.2d at 924.
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attractive range of remedies.1 38 Considering the available
remedies, the United States arguably presented the only
available forum where Laker and its creditors might seek
effective redress for the injuries caused by the cartel. 3 9
These and other factors also merited close consideration
in any attempt to resolve the jurisdictional dispute.
Any determination by the Laker court, whether using a
balancing approach involving consideration of conflicting
factors or a pure effects approach, gives rise to criticism
that the court was partisan to the interests of its jurisdiction. 4' It further requires a court to go beyond its exper4
tise and its governmental role.1 '
The Laker court pointed out that interest analysis may
be useful when determining whether a particular assertion
of jurisdiction is "reasonable" or not.142 That is, it may
be a valid approach to a determination as to whether the
assertion of United States antitrust jurisdiction pursuant
to the Alcoa "effects" test is appropriate or not in a particular case, given the balancing of factors such as those
spelled out in Timberlane. But it is not helpful in cases of
concurrent jurisdiction where the jurisdictional basis of
both forums are "unimpeached," as was the case in Laker.
The court believed that a balancing of interests to determine which forum was "more reasonable" and which
"less reasonable" was unworkable. 43 The balancing of
vaguely defined factors in order to choose between competing forums certainly further complicates an already
complex standard. t44
1-1Since it also subjects the defendants to their greatest possible liability, it
might be argued, from the defendants' perspective, that jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
,19 It is, of course, possible that another jurisdiction could be persuaded to apply U.S. antitrust law as a mandatory foreign law. See supra note 76.
140 See Maier, supra note 40, at 593-95; Grossfeld and Rogers supra note 3, at
936. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
,4 Laker, 731 F.2d at 950. See also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.
Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
Laker, 731 F.2d at 952.
,43 Id. at 952-53, n.169.
142

,44 According to the court, the judicial interest analysis would only serve to
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Also, the intent of the British action, to halt the United
States proceeding, cuts against the use of an interest analysis. Its use in Laker would, depending on the outcome of
the balancing of various factors, permit one forum, with
jurisdiction, to block the adjudication of a claim in another forum which also has jurisdiction. Such a result is
inherently distinguishable from application of the test to
ascertain if the assertion of jurisdiction by a forum in a
given case is reasonable in the context of, in part, principles of international comity. Comity cannot be advanced
by an interest analysis that could permit one forum to dictate the ability of another forum, with recognized jurisdiction, to adjudicate a claim legitimately before it.
The Laker court could, of course, have applied the interest analysis and found the British assertion of jurisdiction
'unreasonable" since a valid claim based on United States
law where United States jurisdiction was established was
being attacked by a British forum without a remedy for
the alleged wrong. The decisional result would have been
the same but the effect may have been to give interest
analysis a legitimacy it does not deserve. Certainly, a
United States court declaring a foreign forum's assertion
ofjurisdiction "unreasonable," as opposed to reviewing a
U.S. court's jurisdictional assertion, is inherently suspect
45
and can do little for the cause of international comity.
VI.

A JUDICIAL

VACUUM

While the Circuit Court of Appeals accurately points
out the pitfalls ofjudicial interest balancing, at least where
conflicting assertions of jurisdiction are present, its own
analysis is troublesome. The court, in sum, in affirming
the issuance of the injunction barring Sabena and KLM
choose "between potential forums to the extent the less reasonable assertion is
characterized as unreasonable." Id. at 952 n.169. See infra text accompanying
note 145.
1-5 It would seem clear that the fewer pronouncements made by one forum
about the jurisdictional base or substantive legal claims of a foreign forum the less
likely direct conflicts between the two will arise and the more likely principles of
comity can be preserved.
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from seeking British relief from Laker's U.S. antitrust suit,
simply applied domestic law, on the assumption that it
had no other real choice and that ultimate conflict resolution was for the political arms of government through diplomatic channels. 146 In so ruling, the court could find no
14 7
real aid from principles of international law.
The Laker court's "no rule" 1 48 approach is perhaps justified based on the facts of that case. Another jurisdiction,
the United Kindgom, with little thought to notions of
comity and balancing of competing interests, had acted to
interfere with United States jurisdiction legitimately asserted. Further, the interfering jurisdiction, Britain, could
offer no alternate forum of redresss for the alleged
wrongs. But the confrontational circumstances of Laker
should not yield a precedent which is applied to all cases
involving concurrent assertions of jurisidiction; further,
the Laker court's abdication of itself as the proper forum
for resolution of the competing jurisdictional claims may
be overbroad.
Itis difficult to imagine a different result by the Circuit
Court of Appeals given the position of the United Kingdom. But the adoption of a method or approach to resolve such conflicts and a recognition that, like it or not,
the courts are frequently called upon to decide disputes
involving antagonistic government policies is needed.
For example, a "shared values" approach, the adoption
of which has been urged elsewhere,' 4 9 attempts to avoid
some of the difficulties of the judicial interest analysis
method. It would take into account British interests and
would, if employed, support affirmance of the United
- Laker, 731 F.2d at 955-56.
,17See, e.g., id.
at 950 ("no evidence that interest balancing represents a rule of
international law"); see also id. at 952 ("no principle of international law which
abolishes concurrent jurisdiction.").
'48

See Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J.

L. 783, 789 (1984). In effect, the Laker court did nothing more than apply
the Alcoa "effects" test.
,49See Grossfeld & Rogers, supra note 3.
INT'L
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States district court's anti-suit injunction. 150 Further, its
use would advance an alternative methodology for resolution of jurisdictional conflicts to that espoused in
Timberlane.
No approach to international jurisdiction conflict resolution is beyond reproach, 1 5 given the complexity and
political sensitivity of the issues. A reasoned approach,
however, confirms the judiciary's role, even though
forced, as an arbiter of international disputes and gives
credibility to the process by which the decision is made.
The D.C. Court of Appeals opinion is subject to criticism not because of its result, but because of its lack of
methodology in reaching its decision. The court criticizes
and refuses to apply judicial interest balancing, yet urges
nothing in its place. The vacuum thus created may be interpreted, particularly by those abroad, as a mandate to
assert and protect the jurisdiction of the forum where a
conflict exists and as an abdication by the court of the role
of dispute arbiter to diplomatic circles.
Courts are, of course, in the business of resolving disputes. They typically confront and decide procedural, jurisdictional, and substantive legal and factual
controversies, often in the same case. For example, in
Laker the conflict involved competing jurisdictional claims
150 Under a shared values approach, the forum court would initially consider
the values underlying the foreign law. If similar values were found the foreign
law, if mandatory, see supra note 76, would be applied unless the foreign interest in
the matter is insubstantial compared to the interest of the forum state. While a
balancing of interests is not avoided, it comes in the context of greater deference
to foreign mandatory law. See Grossfeld & Rogers, supra note 3, at 942-44. In
Laker, a shared values analysis would have supported the U.S. district court's antisuit injunction, since it is unlikely that a U.S. court would conclude that the British
action objecting to U.S. antitrust principles espouses values shared by the United
States. The balancing of the interests of the states would thus be unnecessary
under the Laker facts.
15, For other approaches see Meesen, supra note 148 (urging that only the interests of the states, not the private litigants, should be balanced); Gerber, The Extra-

territorialApplication of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983)

(urging that German approach of "conflict avoidance" be adopted). See also Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction
under "effects" test appropriate only if no principles of comity, conflicts of law or
international law are violated).
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but what really was at issue was a dispute over substantive
law, the United States antitrust provisions. The involvement of divergent government policies towards jurisdiction and economic laws certainly taxes the judiciary's
dispute resolution capabilities and suggests the need for
other, concurrent, dispute resolution forums. 52 It does
not, however, absolve the courts of their responsibilities
to the private litigants seeking redress through their

auspices. 153
The United States Court of Appeals in Laker, in affirming its jurisdiction, does protect the right of access of
the private parties before it. But in failing to articulate
any guidelines for conflict resolution, it falls short in its
role of dispute arbiter. The courts' principal responsibility is to adjudicate the claims and define the rights of the
parties before it. It should develop strategies and principles for doing so, taking account as far as possible of the
international interests and tensions involved. A
recogniton that the judiciary cannot resolve public international disputes does not absolve it from its obligation to
mediate private grievances under its jurisdiction. To the
extent that Laker replaces the judicial interest balancing
test with an analytical void, it represents a step backward
in the resolution of disputes arising from the conflict of
nations' laws and policies.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Laker litigation illustrates a notable case of foreign
resistance to assertions of United States antitrust jurisdiction. Indeed, the United States jurisdictional basis for
the suit brought by Laker in the District of Columbia is
not in the least questionable. Where, however, legitimate
152 For example, the consideration by the forum court of foreign interests, a
much criticized aspect of judicial interest balancing, may be unavoidable, given
the judiciary's role as dispute arbiter.
153In government enforcement actions, where the Justice Department is a
party, the court's obligation to resolve the conflict is arguably not as imperative.
The government does have other dispute resolution mechanisms at its disposal,
not available to private litigants.
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assertions of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction involve foreign
party defendants, foreign reaction, which is centrally directed to the substance of U.S. antitrust law, is certain to
follow. Foreign state mechanisms to block American antitrust suits are unprecedented and present a formidable
task for United States courts which must, in a suit involving foreign interests, somehow take those interests into
account in resolving the often private disputes before
them.
The United States Court of Appeals decision was a necessary and predictable affirmance of the right of a U.S.
court to adjudicate, free from foreign interference, an antitrust suit where valid "territorial" jurisdiction over the
parties to the dispute incontrovertibly exists. The later
House of Lords decision, ruling that the Laker antitrust
action against British and other airlines did not trample
upon British sovereignty, exhibits the .extremity of the
earlier British position.
But, while the result reached by the U.S. Court of Appeals is not controversial, the route taken is. The issuance
of a more limited injunction might have provided greater
room for resolution of the conflict brought about by the
U.S. antitrust laws through compromise rather than judicial fiat. On a broader level, the difficulties of the judicial
interest analysis appear to make its use as a mechanism
for dispute resolution impractical, at least where valid assertions of concurrent jurisdiction are involved. The
Laker court's failure to supply an alternative methodology,
however, tends to undermine the result, particularly from
the perspective of foreign observers who may view the
Laker decision as another example of United States antitrust provincialism and zealotry.

